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The Radical Use of History in the Study 
of International Law 
Henry Jones1 
 
“History as inspiration and ideology has a built-in tendency to become self-
justifying myth. […] It is the business of historians to try and remove these 
blindfolds” – Eric Hobsbawm, What Can History Tell Us about Contemporary 
Society? 
 “To learn from the past … the distinction between what is necessary and what is 
the product merely of our own contingent arrangements, is to learn the key to 
self-awareness itself” – Quentin Skinner,  Meaning and Understanding in the 
History of Ideas 
“People know what they do; frequently they know why they do what they do; but 
what they don't know is what what they do does.” ― Michel Foucault, Madness 
and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason 
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Abstract 
In this paper I look at the use of history in international law, starting with specific 
historical studies of the subject. I then go on to consider why history is useful; with 
particular reference to ideas of what is contingent and what is necessary. This leads 
to a detailed consideration in the majority of the paper of different approaches to 
history, all with a shared desire to use history to address the present. I look at the 
broad approaches of Marxist, Contextualist and Post-modern history, with the focus 
on key exponents of these positions; Eric Hobsbawm, Quentin Skinner and Michel 
Foucault. In conclusion, I argue that we must study the history of international law to 
understand and change its present. This work will be more productive with a proper 
consideration of historical method.  
 Keywords: International Law; History; Historiography; Contingency; Necessity  
 
1. Introduction 
A radical approach to something is commonly understood as being a thorough, far reaching 
proposal for change, in practice or understanding, addressing the fundamental nature of 
something. The etymology of the word is in physical science; radical refers to the most 
fundamental natural processes. In its common political use it is a term denoting a desire for 
large scale change, usually but not essentially, associated with the left and with 
revolutionary change. As Raymond Williams notes, the term in twentieth century political 
use arose out of difficulties in the use of the terms communist or socialist: ‘[r]adical seemed 
to offer a way of avoiding dogmatic and factional associations while reasserting the need for 
vigorous and fundamental change’.2  
This last sense captures why I have used the word. I want to examine different approaches 
to histories, which I argue have a shared radical character, but which often fall into different 
dogmatic camps. I will not attempt to give any sort of complete radical history here, a task 
obviously beyond one paper, or even one person. I simply set out to explore different 
approaches to history, and in particular the history of ideas, which I find useful in 
understanding the history of international law. The potential radicalism of my approach lies 
in the use of historical study to question the present. This use of history, which may be 
termed political but is free of specific demands and conclusions, is to demonstrate the 
contingency of the present. I ask the twin questions of why things are the way they are and 
how could they have been different. 
                                                     
2
 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (Revised edition, Oxford University Press, 
1983) at 252. For a recent and provocative discussion of the idea of radical international law, see Bill Bowring, 
‘What is Radical in “Radical International Law”?’, 22 Finnish Yearbook of International Law (2011) 1-29 
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The history of International law has grown exponentially as an area of interest in recent 
years. The history of international law was the ‘most neglected’3 part of international law 
for some time, but this is no longer the case. There is a wealth of study which can be 
generally classed historical, both in mainstream and critical or theoretical scholarship. I want 
to argue in part that a weakness of much of this work comes from a lack of reflection on 
history itself. Whether the work is a history of international law, within international law, or 
international law in history,4 the method of historiography is often unclear. I am not 
attempting to represent ‘the state of the field’, merely to re-emphasise the potential in the 
use of history for political ends, rather than simply for its own sake. 
The question of method is a very simple one; an historical method is simply how we choose 
our data. The question of what goes in and what is left out of a history leads to a lot of 
complicated issues, some of which I discuss below, but is at root this simple. Depending on 
what we want to say about the present, we choose different historical materials. After all, it 
should not be so controversial to suggest that a truly accurate history is either impossible or 
useless. As Paul Ricoeur very nearly says, a truly accurate history would be as useful as Lewis 
Carroll’s one-to-one scale map.5 A choice of scale is made, and this requires the inclusion 
and exclusion of material. But also a political choice is made. History which confirms the 
necessity of the present and the legitimacy of contemporary global arrangements does 
exist, and is consistently popular.6 Simply doing history is not radical, but a radical 
disaffection with the present inspires and demands a historical method to support it. 
So, what is wrong with the present that would lead to this sort of search through the data of 
history? More specifically, what is wrong with the present of international law? Poverty is 
one familiar example of the gap between the promise of international law and the actual 
conditions imposed by regulation through international. As Susan Marks, for one, has 
demonstrated, international law is involved in both the promise of a better future through 
development, and the creation of so called poverty ‘traps’.7 Poverty is ‘something certain 
groups of people do to others’.8 In a search for a way to expose this relationship, and do 
something to oppose it, history offers a basis for argument. The objection to poverty is the 
political aim which inspires the choice of historical material.  
                                                     
3
 Lassa Oppenheim, ‘The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method’, 2 American Journal of 
International Law (1908) 313-356. This sentiment was echoed by Wilhelm Grewe, The Epochs of International 
Law (Trans. M. Byers, De Gruyter, 2000) at 1 
4
 These terms are taken from Matt Craven, ‘Introduction: International Law and Its Histories’, in Matt Craven,   
Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Maria Vogiatzi (eds), Time, History and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff: Leiden, 
2007) at 7 
5
 Lewis Carroll, Sylvie and Bruno Concluded (MacMillan, 1893). This is sometimes referred to as the paradox of 
the complete map. Ricoeur discusses different scales of history, and their uses, in Paul Ricoeur, Memory, 
History, Forgetting (Trans. K. Blamey & D. Pellauer, University of Chicago Press, 2004) at 209-216 
6
 The popular history writing of Niall Ferguson is one obvious example. 
7
 Susan Marks, ‘Human Rights and the Bottom Billion’, 1 European Human Rights Law Review (2009) 37-49 
8
 Ibid. at 48 
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The three historical methodologies or approaches which I am interested in are the Marxist, 
Cambridge School, and Postmodern. These broad terms are insufficient to cover the variety 
of methods which they contain. For a Marxist historian who has regularly explained and 
defended his methodology I will look at Eric Hobsbawm.9 One of the key academics in 
developing the Cambridge School approach to the history of ideas is Quentin Skinner,10 and 
he too has published widely and repeatedly on the subject of method and in defence of his 
method. Postmodern is perhaps the least useful term, and certainly does not help much in 
its unifying of diverse approaches to a variety of subjects under one label. I will be looking at 
the historical method and work of Michel Foucault.11 
The shortcomings of these labels must be highlighted from the start. Marxist and 
Postmodern are highly loaded terms, easily used in a tone of mocking chastisement.12 
Furthermore, and in common with Cambridge School, they do not serve to easily demarcate 
an area or type of study, referring to a wide variety of practices and political viewpoints. 
However, they do suggest a general approach to history, and are at least useful for this. I 
use the terms knowingly, and after considering their shortcomings, as still the best label for 
the work I am interested in.  
Alongside this discussion of different radical approaches to history, I want to briefly look at 
one historical subject in international law; the work of Hugo Grotius. Specifically, I am 
interested in how the history of Grotius can be told in several different ways, each true to 
their own standards, each satisfying the most basic conditions of historical practice. 
However, that a variety exists tells us something about the practice of history in 
international law, and what it is for. In Hersch Lauterpacht’s classic text, ‘The Grotian 
Tradition in International Law’,13 he describes a pragmatic tradition of international law 
scholarship which draws its origin from Hugo Grotius. In the work of Richard Tuck, we find a 
very different Grotius, one who is writing to justify the imperial practices of the Dutch 
                                                     
9
 My starting point for Hobsbawm’s discussion of the practice of history is Eric Hobsbawm, On History (Abacus: 
London, 1998) I am aware of alternative statements of Marxist methodology, but have chosen to focus on 
Hobsbawm’s for purposes of space and clarity. Particularly notable is E. P. Thompson Poverty of Theory and 
Other Essays (Merlin Press: London, 1978) 
10
 Skinner has published a variety of works on historical method, as a starting point see Quentin Skinner, 
Visions of Politics Volume One: Regarding Method (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 
11
 Foucault’s reflections on methodology are dispersed throughout his works, but a good place to start is 
Michel Foucault, ‘Questions of Method’ in Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954 – 1984 volume 3 (James D. 
Faubion ed., Penguin: London, 2002) at 223 and Paul Veyne, ‘Foucault Revolutionises History’ in Foucault and 
his Interlocutors (Arnold I. Davidson ed., University of Chicago Press, 1997) at 146 
12
 For example, Terry Eagleton uses the term postmodern critically in The Illusions of Postmodernism 
(Blackwell: Oxford, 1996), and with scorn in his earlier work ‘Capitalism, Modernism and Postmodernism’, I 
New Left Review (1985) at 152. Marxism and Marx are given similar treatment by a variety of postmodernists; 
particularly relevant are Foucault’s comments, dealt with later, in various interviews, lectures and books. 
Postmodern may be regarded as redundant following Sokal’s Hoax, and Marxism rejected as the failed 
ideology of the Cold War.   
13
 Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition in International Law’, 23 British Yearbook of International Law 
(1946) 1-53. This is discussed under The Historical Turn in International Law, below. 
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Provinces.14 In Benjamin Straumann’s work we find a third Grotius, one who is deeply 
involved in the Roman philosophical arguments which fill his work, and from which his 
originality is drawn.15 This variety of interpretations is not explored to set up which is 
‘better’ history, or which is more or less true, but simply to demonstrate the different aims 
and intentions which produce different histories.  
In conclusion I argue that history can be used as a radical tool. Indeed, history used to 
demonstrate the contingency of current arrangements, ‘history that might have gone 
another way’,16 is a radical revisiting of the study of international law. By doing this I want to 
open up new possibilities for considering political action in international law. The classic 
history sustains a system of international law which continues to allow global inequality and 
catastrophic poverty.17 A radical history, under whatever methodological banner we might 
choose, can and should demonstrate the contingency of this present understanding of 
international law.  
2. The Historical Turn in International Law 
In the last few years there have been a number of attempts to sum up the ‘state of the field’ 
of the history of international law. George Galindo has argued that ‘The Gentle Civilizer of 
Nations represents a historiographical turn in the work of Koskenniemi and paves the way 
for the same in the field of international law.’18 Koskenniemi himself has offered an 
overview of current historical study of international law, 19  particularly the work of German 
scholars and the Max Planck Institute’s works in the history of international law in 
Germany.20 Koskenniemi offers some explanations for the increased interest in the history 
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 Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace (Oxford University Press, 1999) This is discussed under 
Contextualism, below. 
15
 Straumann’s main work is currently only available in German, Hugo Grotius und die Antike. Römisches Recht 
und römishe Ethik im frühneuzeitlichen Naturrecht. A selection of papers drawn from this work are available in 
English, see in particular Straumann, ‘Is Modern Liberty Ancient? Roman Remedies and Natural Rights in Hugo 
Grotius’ Early Works on Natural Law’, 27 Law and History Review (2009) 55-85. For a general introduction to 
Straumann’s work on Grotius see Randall Lesaffer’s review essay ‘On Roman Ethics, Rhetoric and Law in 
Grotius’, 10 Journal of the History of International Law (2008) 343-347. This work of Straumann is discussed in 
the Conclusion, below. 
16
 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 5 (italics in original)  
17
 See Susan Marks, ‘Human Rights and the Bottom Billion’ supra note 7 and Margot Salomon, Global 
Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty and the Development of International Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2007) 
18
 George Galindo, ‘Martti Koskenniemi and the Historiographical Turn in International Law’, 16 The European 
Journal of International Law (2005) 539-559 
19
 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The History of International Law Today’, Rechtsgeschichte (2004). This article develops, 
along with ‘Histories of International Law: Dealing with Eurocentrism’, 19 Rechtsgeschichte (2011) 152-176, 
many concerns about the practice of history of international law first raised in the introduction to The Gentle 
Civilizer of Nations 
20
 An overview and electronic copies of much of the research group’s work can be found at 
http://www.rg.mpg.de/en/forschung/voelkerrechtsgeschichte/ It should also be added that the Eric Castrén 
Institute in Helsinki has, under Koskenniemi, produced a huge amount of historical research. For a more 
detailed overview of the study of the history of international law, again with the focus firmly in Germany, see 
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of the discipline, particularly a ‘sense of increased political possibility connected with the 
end of the Cold War’21 and the new opportunities connected with a postmodern outlook 
which thinks against the old grand narratives. He also outlines three areas of history of 
international law which need developing; the intellectual history of international law, the 
focus on the west and its “Other”, and an historical sociology of international law. In 
intellectual history, Koskenniemi favours a contextualist outlook, drawing on the 
methodological work of the Cambridge school.22 The relationship of the West with the non-
European world in the history of international law is also under researched, although there 
is important work from critical and postcolonial scholars, as well as other studies by third 
world lawyers and some significant treatment of colonialism.23 The third and most open 
category of historical sociology includes the need to study the interplay of different types of 
international society and normative systems, as well as the connection between 
international law and other social developments, such as economics. Finally, sociology could 
also include the history of international law as a professional practice, again something 
Koskenniemi himself has engaged with. 
Also written in the style of addressing the state of the field, and most useful here as a 
starting point, is Matt Craven’s introduction to the edited collection Time, History and 
International Law.24 Craven splits the histories of international law in to three groups; 
histories of international law, histories within international law and international law in 
history. The history of international law is the grand history which Oppenheim hoped for. 
Instances of this sort exist, such as Nussbaum’s A Concise History of the Law of Nations25 or 
Grewe’s Epochs26 but are rarely and perhaps even ill advisedly undertaken. The problem of 
telling the history of international law is that a singular, unified history requires a grand 
narrative which ‘somehow captures ‘international law’ on a broad canvass as a singular idea 
or set of ideas tied together in some coherent manner.’27 This approach then demands a set 
of assumptions about what constitutes international law, and who is involved in making its 
history. This shuts out any opposing voices, and ultimately denies the possibility of any 
other history.  
One type of history of international law written in this style is Lauterpacht’s. Writing in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Lauterpacht uses Grotius’ work as the basis 
of a call to return to ‘principle … against makeshifts’.28 A Grotian international lawyer is one 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Ingo Hueck, ‘The Discipline of the History of International Law – New Trends and Methods on the History of 
International Law’ 3 Journal of the History of International Law (2001) 194-217 
21
 Koskenniemi, ‘The History of International Law’, supra note 19 at 5 
22
 Which I deal with in some detail below. 
23
 Koskenniemi himself has recently reiterated the need to write a non Euro-centric history of international law 
in Koskenniemi, ‘Dealing with Eurocentrism’, supra note 19 
24
 Craven, ‘Introduction: International Law and Its Histories’, supra note 4 
25
 Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (MacMillan: New York, 1947) 
26
 Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, supra note 3  
27
 Craven, ‘Introduction: International Law and Its Histories’, supra note 4 
28
 Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition’, supra note 13, at 1  
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‘who has found a workable synthesis of natural law and state practice’.29This is a pragmatic 
approach, which seeks to construct a functioning system of positive law while not being 
afraid to call on natural law to fill the gaps. On this basis, Grotius was not a Grotian, in 
Lauterpacht’s terms, as he failed to provide ‘a workable synthesis of natural law and state 
practice’.30 While Lauterpacht is dismissive of Grotius’ method, which has ‘no redeeming 
feature’,31 he does approve of Grotius aim, the humanisation of the conduct of war. He then 
sets out to redescribe the content of Grotius’ work according to the need for it in 
contemporary international society, focusing on Grotius’ work on sources, practice, and the 
goals of international law. Lauterpacht’s is a history of law’s struggle against politics. 
Iain Scobbie tells us that Grotius is used as ‘essentially a conceit upon which Lauterpacht 
hangs his own argument’.32 Lauterpacht was himself writing in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, and clearly was expressing his own concerns for the humanisation of war and 
the need to secure peace. While this is true, I want to highlight two aspects of Lauterpacht’s 
use of Grotius which I think demonstrate a problematic and unsatisfactory use of history, his 
argument for Grotius’ importance, and his discussion of ‘reason of state’. Lauterpacht 
accepts Grotius’ ‘pre-eminence’ unquestioningly, despite all the shortcomings of his work, 
for two simple reasons. Firstly, everyone else generally accepts the central importance of 
Grotius,33 and secondly, his work is so often referred to by both his successors, and those 
making arguments in international law.34 In a central section of Lauterpacht’s article he 
blames the ‘unprecedented ascendancy of the ideas of ‘reason of state’35 for the horrors of 
war in the first half of the Twentieth Century. Lauterpacht, as an international lawyer 
writing in 1946 wants international law to exist as a final end to such arguments, as a limit 
on absolute state sovereignty. He roots this in Grotius, and finds it to be Grotius’ argument, 
and it does have to be found. Grotius never once mentions ‘reason of state’, as it is ‘so 
obvious and so fundamental that … he regards it as below the dignity of his work to engage 
with ... the subject’. Grotius also makes no mention of Machiavelli, his ‘disapproval is one of 
silence’.36 From these silences, Lauterpacht finds an absolute rejection of ‘reason of state’ 
thinking, and a strong and principled opposition to Machiavelli and his followers. 
I do not think this is acceptable as a treatment of an historical text. The work of Grotius 
exists in a particular time, for a particular purpose. Lauterpacht’s arguments are strong and 
noble, but the question must be asked; why are they hidden behind Grotius? The answer 
must be that by adopting a starting point which everyone agrees on, that Grotius is the 
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 Ibid., at 5 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid., at 4 
32
 Iain Scobbie, ‘The Theorist as Judge: Hersch Lauterpacht’s Concept of the International Judicial Function’, 2 
European Journal of International Law (1997) at 266 
33
 Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition’, supra note 13, at 19 
34
 Ibid., at 15 
35
 Ibid., at 33 
36
 Ibid., at 30 
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Father of International Law, then by putting his arguments in Grotius’ mouth they are more 
persuasive. This is true, but this is history in the rhetorical mode, used to tell a persuasive 
story, it hides a great deal about what international law does and has done. Lauterpacht 
never acknowledges that it is even possible to tell a different, but still accurate, history. This 
history shuts down debate and excludes politics. Any radical history must acknowledge that 
all history is ideological, and oppose Lauterpacht’s claim of absolute truth.  
The point I am trying to make is similar to that which Susan Marks makes when discussing 
the ‘falseness’ of false contingency.37 Her point is that things are false not because they do 
not match reality, but because of what they exclude. Lauterpacht’s history is ‘generally true 
so far as it goes, but false as to what it excludes’.38 The discussion of Grotius’ contribution to 
international law, for example, stops at the positive. It excludes alternative narratives which 
highlight, for example, Grotius’ deep engagement with Dutch colonialism. This is not to say 
that Lauterpacht did not know this, but he acted as if he did not. He acted as if no other 
narrative were possible. Lauterpacht was seeking to bolster a form of international law to 
which he was fully committed. This is the political position which directed his choice of 
method when he came to write history. 
In Craven’s account, there are histories of international law written primarily in opposition 
to the possibility of a unified history. These are the histories Koskenniemi described as made 
possible by a postmodern rejection of grand narratives. Craven draws attention to the work 
of Nathaniel Berman as an example, and the inspiration that he derives from the historical 
work of Foucault. The Gentle Civilizer of Nations also fits in to the position of being chiefly 
written against a traditional unified form of history, rather than necessarily for an 
alternative. This Koskenniemi sets out in his introduction, where he declares his ‘non-
rigorous’ and ‘experimental’ method, mixing biographical and contextual history to present 
a narrative of the profession and its ‘sensibility’.39 As Craven points out, there are tensions 
within Koskenniemi’s method, which he fails to resolve.40 Koskenniemi does not succeed in 
writing either a non Eurocentric history of international law, or one which does away with 
the story of great men and their deeds. His history remains essentially ‘Whiggish’, in spite of 
his attempts to avoid this with talk of the ‘sensibilities’ of international lawyers. These 
criticisms, and others, were developed more fully by Galindo.  
In an excellent, critical review of The Gentle Civilizer of Nations,41 Galindo argues that while 
the book is an important and brilliant contribution, it leaves many questions in need of an 
answer. Most of these questions concern Koskenniemi’s historiography, or lack of it. Firstly, 
the book is supposed to answer some of the questions left by From Apology to Utopia, in 
particular the criticism that understanding law as a set of argumentative practices does not 
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 Susan Marks, 'False Contingency', 62(1) Current Legal Problems (2009) at 15-19 
38
 Ibid., at 17 
39
 Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, supra note 16, at 1-10 
40
 Craven, ‘Introduction: International Law and Its Histories’, supra note 4, at 12-13 
41
 Galindo, ‘The Historiographical Turn’, supra note 18 
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tell us enough about what international lawyers do. The main objective of The Gentle 
Civilizer of Nations is to ‘understand why international lawyers take certain positions and 
support certain arguments at different times and places’.42 The need for history in this task 
is that only ‘investigation of international law as it was practised in the past can heighten 
the self-understanding of international lawyers today’.43 Koskenniemi then consciously 
unites his theoretical and historical projects as directly related, an important step in bringing 
together historical and theoretical work more generally.  
Koskenniemi certainly succeeded improving the understanding of the development of 
professional international law. The book has been hugely inspirational to many, a number in 
which I would humbly include myself. However, his work lacks a clear engagement or 
discussion of the practice of history. He describes his work as a history of ideas, but apart 
from some references to the historical concerns of Foucault, does not elaborate. As Galindo 
notes, Koskenniemi has referred positively to the Cambridge school elsewhere, and I 
disagree with Galindo’s dismissal of this work as having nothing in common with Foucault. 
Certainly some of the familiar criticisms of Foucault as a historian may cross over in to the 
work of Koskenniemi, such as the disappearance of opposing continuities in the focus on 
discontinuities, but more crucial is this lack of open reflection on method. This is most 
apparent as a problem when Koskenniemi talks of spirit and sensibilities which unite his 
subject. The esprit d’internationalité of the international lawyers in this period is put 
forward as an a priori fact, and Koskenniemi does not go to any great lengths to 
demonstrate that it did not or could not have existed anywhere else.  
Again the problem of the dialectic of necessity and contingency emerges. What in this 
narrative is necessary and what contingent? How could things have ‘gone another way’, and 
what would it have looked like? Ultimately, why did events not progress in that other way? 
This is the problem with not openly discussing and reflecting on method, and in not 
exploring why the history is written. The Gentle Civilizer of Nations says something 
important about the missed potential for a better world through international law, but it 
does not tell us why international law failed.  
Finally, Koskenniemi describes his as a ‘narrative’ history, again without reflection on what 
this might mean. Two obvious engagements with this issue spring to mind from works on 
historical method; Skinner’s work arguing against ‘the Cult of the Fact’44 and Hayden 
White’s work.45 I will develop both of these positions later. Ultimately, all of these criticisms 
concern Koskenniemi’s lack of discussion of historiography as a major shortcoming in an 
otherwise brilliant work. Galindo, by questioning Koskenniemi’s historiography, raises a 
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 Ibid., at 541 
43
 Ibid.  
44
 Quentin Skinner, ‘The Cult of the Fact’, in Visions of Politics, supra note 10, at 8-26 
45
 Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (John Hopkins 
University Press: Baltimore, 1987) in particular Chapter 2 at 26. See more generally Metahistory (John Hopkins 
University Press: Baltimore, 1973) 
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similar issue to that which I address here: that a proper and open consideration of the 
methods of history must be engaged in to properly understand and even achieve the 
political possibilities of historical work. Koskenniemi does declare that his history is written 
to allow for action in contemporary international law, and that history is in this sense a 
political act.46 However, the subtle way he describes his methodology, and the absence of a 
clear historiography, means that we are still left with a question of what this history is for, 
and how exactly it might be different.  
It is not possible to write a history of everything and everyone who might be included in the 
history of international law. The presentation of a unified history is always partial, and the 
critical historical responses to this tradition have highlighted many alternative versions of 
the same sort of history. History within international law, as an approach, involves the focus 
on the history of an aspect of international law, such as an idea, a theme or an institution. 
This is by far the most common form of history of international law. This sort of history 
starts from the simple observation that all lawyers are, to some extent, engaged in history,47 
and can include such diverse studies of the same object as Neff’s War and the Law of 
Nations: A General History48 or Kochi’s The Other’s War.49 This sort of history has its own 
attendant shortcomings. Firstly, there is a risk of presuming that the object or idea under 
investigation has at all times remained the same. The meaning of concepts, such as territory 
or sovereignty, has changed over time. However, acknowledgement of this can lead to 
further difficulties, for what is the point of telling the history of sovereignty if the thing 
under consideration is not always the same? Alternatively, when telling a history of the 
evolution of a concept, the story quickly becomes yet another progress narrative and a lapse 
back in to a grand narrative dictated by a teleology of ‘progress’.50 
Craven’s third category, international law in history, is the history of international law as a 
social phenomenon, and its relation to others, such as politics, economics or sociology. 
International law is here seen as either taking a role within or against some other social 
force; international law as a part of politics, or as a corrective or restraint upon politics. An 
example of this sort of history is found in much of the critical history of international law 
and its role in imperialism. It is also present in a mainstream version, in the simplistic 
account of practice forming law, or in the many answers to the realist challenge passed 
downed by Austin and Morgenthau.  
It is in part as a solution to these various problems and shortcomings that I propose to draw 
greater attention to the methods of history.  Hayden White first wrote about the political 
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potential of historical study in a 1966 article entitled ‘The Burden of History’.51 In this work, 
White declared that ‘we require a history that will educate us to discontinuity more than 
ever before; for discontinuity, disruption and chaos is our lot. […] If human beings learn to 
see themselves as disconnected from the past … they may come to realize what an 
enormous amount of freedom they enjoy’.52 The historian’s role must be to ‘participate 
positively in the liberation of the present from the burden of history.’53 At this stage his 
approach is a little crude, but the political intention is plain to see.  
In later work, studying what he came to call ‘metahistory’,54 White stressed the contingency 
of different historical narratives, and the impossibility of one true account. Instead, he 
argued that many different and contradictory accounts could be equally true, and what 
mattered was the intention behind the history writing, or the mode it was written in. 
Metahistory55 sets out a complex structuralist account of different forms of historical 
discourse, the detail of which is not important here. Instead it is the focus on the politics 
inherent in history writing, and the intention to make this visible, which I want to 
emphasise. In his other essential monograph, The Content of the Form,56 White moves away 
from some of these structuralist limitations and the focus on ‘tropes’,57 and instead 
discusses history as narrative, as a form more suited to literary criticism than scientific. 
History is written as narrative to make it comprehensible, but life is not lived according to a 
narrative. This imposition of an invented narrative on to past events hides the chaos and 
chance of lived reality, the ‘meaninglessness which alone can goad the moral sense of living 
human beings to make their lives different for themselves and their children, which is to say, 
to endow their lives with a meaning for which they alone are fully responsible’.58 White’s 
politics may be a little too individualist for some tastes, but they are clear and presented 
openly. History writing is always a political act, and it is most useful for any radical political 
purpose if this is acknowledged and presented. 
Are politics and method related? Yes, method is how we embody our politics. The political 
position I am putting forward here is very simple. International law is deeply involved in the 
ordering of the contemporary world. This is a world in which ‘six million children under five 
years old die annually of malnutrition by causes that could be prevented by existing 
economic and technical resources’.59 It is a world where ‘the terrorism that shall be branded 
as the enemy of humanity [is not] the intellectual property system that allows hundreds of 
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thousands of Africans to march into early death by sexually transmitted disease’.60 These 
are the simple facts which are to be opposed. These are taken directly from Koskenniemi’s 
work. These are the problems of contemporary reality that he opposes. Presumably, these 
are the political issues which drive his radical history. I do not claim that he does not have 
politics, or a method, but that they are at best obscure in his historical writing. In From 
Apology to Utopia, structural biases direct the otherwise indeterminate structure of legal 
arguments.61 These are unacknowledged in the operation of the law. By acknowledging and 
exposing them, Koskenniemi argues they can easily be undermined.62 This is the same work 
that a radical history does, and can contribute to. It is in revealing and undermining these 
biases and certainties that history is useful. This is the value of an open and clear method.  
3. False Necessity and False Contingency 
Before I begin to address the methods of history which I am interested in, I must address 
the issue of contingency specifically. I said I want to look at history which in some way 
demonstrates the contingency of the present. The idea of contingency in international law, 
and law in general, is familiar, and obviously prompts reference to the ideas of necessity and 
contingency, and their ‘false’ corollaries. These ideas and their importance were dealt with 
by Susan Marks in her important paper: ‘False Contingency’.63 Marks uses the idea of false 
contingency ‘as a complement and corrective’64 to false necessity. False necessity is most 
well known as a key idea in the thinking of Roberto Unger65, and Marks elaborates this work 
excellently. The problem Marks identifies with this idea, whilst acknowledging its power and 
influence on herself and others, is that ‘the idea appears to have taken root that to 
investigate “necessary factors” – limits, pressures, systemic constraints, and so on – is to 
commit yourself to determinism in the fatalistic sense.’66  
Marks article also concerns historical study. She begins with reference to the famous line 
from Marx that ‘[men] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please in 
circumstances they choose for themselves; rather they make it in present circumstances, 
given and inherited’.67 The idea of false necessity is in part an historical one. The claim that 
the present is necessary, that things have to be as they are and that historical development 
led inexorably to this situation, is what is to be criticised and undermined as false. However, 
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this falsification of necessity should not, as Marks argues, lead to a situation where 
everything is seemingly possible in a world of chance and chaos. Everything may well be 
possible, but only certain things actually happen. The limits placed on the possibility of 
historical development must not be forgotten. There are various things which may be 
looked at that demonstrate false contingency, and the super-structures which Marx was 
interested in are a prominent one. Marks wants us to remember that while individuals do 
indeed make their own history, and that the present is contingent, the circumstances of 
making history are often determined. The point bears quotation in full: 
I believe it is quite right to hammer the point that history is a social product, not 
given but made. For if it has been made, then it can be remade differently. […] The 
worry I want to explore here, however, is that we may be undertaking this work in a 
way which causes us to neglect the equally important progressive point that 
possibilities are framed by circumstances. While current arrangements can indeed 
be changed, change unfolds within a context that includes systematic constraints 
and pressures. In general terms what I wish to re-evoke is the idea that things can 
be, and quite frequently are, contingent without being random, accidental or 
arbitrary. 
To do this Marks asks for a return to considering the determination of events. Rejecting 
both that things are inevitable, and that the range of outcomes is infinitely malleable, we 
are left with an historical exploration of what is possible. Marks calls her position ‘anti-anti-
Marxism’,68 that is it is not a defence of Marxism, but a resistance to rejections of Marxism. 
It is following this that I start with a consideration of the Marxist historical method, below. 
There is an obvious absence from Marks’ article; the work of Koskenniemi. As discussed 
above, Koskenniemi’s historical work addresses exactly the issue of what to do after 
establishing the contingency of legal arguments. In particular, if The Gentle Civilizer of 
Nations is taken as a follow up to From Apology to Utopia, as Galindo suggests, then it is 
best read as an answer to exactly Marks’ questions. From Apology to Utopia famously puts 
forward what is known as ‘the indeterminacy thesis’. Koskenniemi, as much as anyone, is 
synonymous with highlighting the indeterminacy of international law. However he rejects, in 
terms similar to Marks’, that this leads to ‘an “anything goes” cynical scepticism, the giving 
up of political struggle and the adoption of an attitude of blasé relativism’.69 This is to 
misunderstand the purpose of deconstruction, and to view it as an end in itself. 
Deconstruction leads in Koskenniemi’s work, as in many others, on to a reconstruction.70 
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The reconstruction is the historical study, the demonstration of ‘a history that might have 
gone another way’.71  
Koskenniemi’s work in this area does not make Marks’ article unnecessary or flawed 
however. This is because Koskenniemi’s history does not fulfil Marks’ project, if it even 
seriously engages with it. While Koskenniemi states that his historical study seeks to ‘infuse 
the study of international law with a sense of historical motion and political, even personal, 
struggle’,72 as discussed earlier the methodology, or lack of one, leaves his study politically 
vague and uncommitted. By not setting out his own political struggle, and how he has 
engaged in it, Koskenniemi does not allow us to decide if we want to join him. There is no 
opportunity to judge the value of his history, because we don’t know what he is struggling 
against, or how. The necessary factors are absent; the sense of “anything goes” lingers on.  
Paavo Kotiaho has described this as the ‘contradiction between the appearance and essence 
of Koskenniemi’s work’.73 Koskenniemi’s work appears as a challenge to the liberal 
international legal system; but the culture of formalism ‘is still embedded in the traditional 
structure of international legal argumentation … within the same liberal theory of politics’.74 
This supposedly empty form of law is in fact ‘complicit in the perpetuation of the current 
status quo.’75 Thus the essence of Koskenniemi’s work, and in particular the historical 
project, remains in support of the status quo, since the culture of formalism ignores any 
necessary factors in the practice of legal argumentation. As Akbar Rasulov has compellingly 
put it; 
‘international legal argument almost never works like a coin … it acts more like 
buttered toast: released in a free fall, it may flip over several times, but it will almost 
always land the same side down. (And the question must then become: why?) Any 
suggestion that ‘that is just what toasts do’ would give toasts “way too much 
credit”’.76 
There are necessary conditions which dictate certain outcomes, even where others are or 
were possible. The history of international law must address this, to address the possibility 
of radical change. 
To finish with Koskenniemi then, whom I have attempted to use as an interlocutor, not as a 
target, a few points need to be made. Koskenniemi, under what he calls ‘instrumentalism’, 
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demonstrates a full and subtle awareness of the structural bias of international law. The 
content of the rules is indeterminate, but the focus of them is biased. As he puts it; ‘it is 
never Algeria that will intervene in France, or Finland in Chechnya’.77 There is a reality 
outside the formalism of international law which dictates its operation. These are the 
necessary conditions which limit international law. The point of formalism, as Jason Beckett 
has put it, is empathy.78 It allows an appreciation for others. Under such conditions ‘the 
inner anxiety of the Prince is less a problem to resolve than an objective to achieve’.79 It was 
with this aim that Koskenniemi embarked on history. This is Koskenniemi’s radicalism. I now 
turn to the methods of history to suggest how this radicalism could be joined and built upon 
by others. 
4. Three Methods of Historical Research 
4.1 Marxism 
To delimit the method of historical research generally considered ‘Marxist’ is a difficult task. 
Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte80 is a fantastic piece of historical writing, 
and an excellent exemplar of the method of research. In this text Marx writes of how Louis 
Bonaparte’s coup d’état demonstrated that tragedy repeats as farce, how historical 
processes are at once open and determined, and how unexpected outcomes may be 
explained through an analysis of conditions. In this one text we find a complex 
demonstration of dialectical materialist history, which never the less remains hugely 
readable, comprehensible and entertaining. This text is a demonstration of Marx’s own 
method when writing history. To understand how this same work may be done today I turn 
to Eric Hobsbawm’s work On History,81 and in particular the chapters which address the 
Marxist approach to history. 
The role of Marx as an inspiration is a clear unifying element of different research which we 
might label as Marxist, but the existence of one label does not demonstrate one approach. 
The Marxist approach can be more or less nuanced. Hobsbawm calls the un-nuanced 
Marxism ‘vulgar-Marxism’82. He gives seven main elements of vulgar-Marxism, worth 
quoting as a guide of what not to do; 
(1) The ‘economic interpretation of history’, that is the belief that ‘the economic 
factor is the fundamental factor on which the others are dependent’ (to use R. 
Stammler’s phrase); and more specifically, on which phenomena hitherto not 
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regarded as having much connection with economic matters, depended. To this 
extent it overlapped with 
(2) The model of ‘basis and superstructure’ (used most widely to explain the history 
of ideas). In spite of Marx and Engels’ own warnings and the sophisticated 
observation of some early Marxists such as Labriola, this model of dominance 
and dependence between the ‘economic base’ and the ‘superstructure’ 
mediated at most by 
(3) ‘Class interest and the class struggle’. One has the impression that a number of 
vulgar-Marxist historians did not read much beyond the first page of the 
Communist Manifesto, and the phrase that ‘the [written] history of all hitherto 
existing societies is the history of class struggles’. 
(4) ‘Historical laws and historical inevitability’. It was believed, correctly, that Marx 
insisted on a systematic and necessary development of human society in history, 
from which the contingent was largely excluded, at all events at the level of 
generalisation about long-term movements. Hence the constant preoccupation 
of early Marxist writers on history with such problems as the role of the 
individual or of accident in history. On the other hand this could be, and largely 
was, interpreted as a rigid and imposed regularity, for example in the succession 
of socio-economic formations, or even a mechanical determinism which 
sometimes came close to suggesting that there were no alternatives in history. 
(5) Specific subjects of historical investigations derived from Marx’s own interests, 
for instance in the history of capitalist development and industrialisation, but 
also sometimes from more or less casual remarks. 
(6) Specific subjects of investigation derived not so much from Marx as from the 
interest of the movements associated with his theory, for example in the 
agitations of the oppressed classes (peasants, workers), or in revolutions. 
(7) Various observation about the nature and limits of historiography, derived 
mainly from no. 2 and serving to explain the motives and methods of historians 
who claimed to be nothing but impartial searchers after truth, and prided 
themselves on establishing simply wie es eigentlich gewesen [what actually 
happened].83 
These elements of vulgar-Marxist history had their uses. Hobsbawm allows that such 
simplified approaches to history attracted more attention because they were instantly 
utilisable to re-examine history. Furthermore, the desire to address pressing and obvious 
current issues directed interest to some elements of Marxism instead of others. However, 
Marxist history must be more than simply a general emphasis on economic and social 
factors. Elements of Marx’s own work can be set aside, such as the teleology of his history, 
the specific hierarchy of levels and modes of interaction in the theory of basis and 
superstructure, and his thoughts on Oriental societies. 
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So what should a Marxist approach to history consist of, after avoiding the vulgarity already 
discussed? Firstly, Marxism is an opposition to empiricism, which is the attempt to 
assimilate the study of the social sciences to the natural sciences. Societies are ‘systems of 
relations between human beings, of which the relations entered into for the purpose of 
production and reproduction are primary for Marx’.84 Marxism is about analysing the 
structure and functioning of these systems as self maintaining entities, both in their internal 
relationships and their relationships with the outside environment, both human and non-
human. In this study Marxism insists on a hierarchy of social phenomena, base and 
superstructure, and on the existence of internal tensions, contradictions. The final point is 
that social systems must be viewed historically, and analysis must be aimed at the internal 
dynamic of change in social structure. While Marx’s specific teleology may be rejected, the 
idea of history, or society, progressing cannot. What is needed, what must be constructed, 
and what must be used is a dialectical model, that is a model which accounts for ‘the 
simultaneous existence of stabilising and disruptive elements’.85 
Marx himself wrote very little history, or what might be easily recognised as history. His 
most obviously historical works address current political situations with some historical 
consideration, as seen in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte86 or Class Struggles in 
France.87 The core of this is the materialist conception of history, and this idea, in Marx’s 
own writing, is clearly explored in the The German Ideology88. It can be reduced to a single 
sentence; ‘it is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines 
consciousness.’89 This is Marx’s own Copernican revolution in philosophy, and as important 
to his thinking as any categorical imperative.  
Marx elaborates on the materialist conception of history in the same text; 
This conception of history thus relies on expounding the real process of production – 
starting from the material production of life itself – and comprehending the form of 
intercourse connected with and created by this mode of production, i.e., civil society 
in its various stages, as the basis of all history; describing it in its action as the state, 
and also explaining how all the different theoretical products and forms of 
consciousness, religion, philosophy, morality, etc. etc., arise from it.90 
Hobsbawm stresses that process of production is not simply the material production of life, 
but ‘the complex set of mutually dependent relations among nature, work, social labour and 
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social organisation’.91 Furthermore production is from both hand and head. This is the 
programme of research Marx set down, and the programme followed by Marxist history.  
So, crudely, Marxism in history is a decision that ‘[a]nalysis of any society, at any moment of 
historical development, must begin with analysis of its mode of production’.92 This is a 
radical approach to history, prioritising a particular determinative factor in human social 
development. Marx himself was interested in current political problems. When using 
historical methods, he started from contemporary society and worked backwards. History 
helped explain the present, and the key element was the mode of production, in all its many 
and complicated forms. It is this use of history, to help understand the present, and most 
importantly how to change it, that I call radical. To quote the famous aphorism; ‘the 
philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point is to change it’.93 
When approaching the history of international law from a radical perspective, seeking to 
address fundamental issues, this focus on material elements challenges the image of law 
being created for the solution of purely political problems, out of humanitarian goodness, to 
fix problems suffered by all humanity. This is history with a conservative agenda, a history 
which reassures us that ‘all is for the best, in this best of all possible worlds’.94 As 
Hobsbawm, from his Marxist perspective, put it ‘[h]istory as inspiration and ideology has a 
built-in tendency to become self-justifying myth. […] It is the business of historians to try 
and remove these blindfolds’.95 Of course, it is actually only the business of radical 
historians to remove these blindfolds. The writing of different histories is a conflict, and 
there are plenty who happily write history as self-justifying myth.96 Hobsbawm asserts the 
need to use history to understand the present as a first step towards political change. This is 
a radical aim, and it is an aim common to other approaches to history to which I now turn. 
4.2 Contextualism  
Contextualism is a general term for an approach to history which was pioneered by a group 
of historians of ideas at Cambridge University in the 1960s, taking inspiration from the 
works of Peter Laslett and Morrice Mendelbaum.97 Laslett’s edition of Robert Filmer’s 
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Patriarcha98 in 1949 demonstrated that the work was written long before it was first 
published, written perhaps as early as 1630 and not published until 1679. His edition of 
Locke’s Two Treatises of Government99 discovered a similar time lapse, that Locke had most 
likely written the work in 1681, although it was published in 1690. These two discoveries 
undermined traditional interpretations of why the texts were written and how they were 
received. It also raised questions about what the publishers were trying to do with the text 
by issuing them at this later date. This raising of questions about what was intended in the 
writing of a text, and how it was received by its audience, started the investigation of the 
context of famous works of political thought. The approach, as with that in the previous 
section, begins with an exploration of what not to do. 
In 1969 Quentin Skinner published an essay which quickly came to serve as a manifesto for 
this new approach; ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’.100 In this Skinner 
attacked, even ridiculed, a wide variety of received historical understanding of political 
thinking. His basic argument was that much of the activity termed the history of ideas 
‘suffered from a radical confusion between systematic theory (or “philosophy”) and 
history’.101 Skinner then worked through a variety of what he called ‘mythologies’ which 
arise from this confusion, and the problems this creates. The two most prominent are 
anachronism, the attributing to authors of concepts which they could not have known, and 
prolepsis, treating the author as addressing problems about which he would not have 
known. The primary target of the article is ‘the methodology dictated by the claim that the 
text itself should form the self-sufficient object of inquiry and understanding.’102 Scholars 
who adopt this position do so because the text contains ‘“timeless elements,” in the form of 
“universal ideas,” even a “dateless wisdom” with “universal application.”’103 This viewpoint, 
from which the historian is ‘set’104 in his approach to texts, produces mythologies. 
The first and most persistent mythology is that an author will have produced a set of 
doctrines on each of the topics in his subject. This ‘mythology of doctrines’105 leads to the 
task of anyone working on the history of ideas being the discovery of the doctrines of the 
classic authors. This might mean that a few scattered remarks on a subject are brought 
together as a ‘doctrine’, or that some familiar terms may be read as part of a doctrine about 
which the author could not have known, such as reading Edward Coke as having a position 
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on judicial review some centuries before the idea existed.106 Alternatively, the search for 
doctrines in the history of ideas becomes an exercise in tracing the emergence of a doctrine 
which was always somehow immanent. The doctrine was always there, waiting to be 
discovered, and research should be in to who discovered which parts. Skinner rightly points 
out that this approach assumes that ideas stand independent of agents; that the idea 
somehow existed without anyone there to think it.107  
The corollary to this mistake is to take the work of a classic author who fails to enunciate a 
clear doctrine. This leads to either their chastisement for this failure, such as Lauterpacht’s 
paradoxical claim that Grotius was not a Grotian,108 or more usually to supplying the author 
with the doctrine ‘proper to their subject, but which they have unaccountably failed to 
discuss.’109 Just one example of this absurdity is the criticising of Locke for not making clear 
his position on universal suffrage.110 Furthermore, the assumption that an author is 
contributing to the argument of a certain discourse, their writing is then judged as poorer 
for failing to take in to account some crucial element. This repeatedly leaves the question of 
whether any of these writers were intending, or could have intended, the undertaking 
which they are castigated for failing to undertake.  
The second mythology is ‘the mythology of coherence’.111 This is the belief that where a 
writer’s position on a perceived essential doctrine is unclear, it is the task of the historian to 
provide the missing coherence. At its most basic, this work rules out the possibility of 
authors simply changing their minds, or making mistakes, and instead seeks some unifying 
first principle that the author held. Skinner concludes that ‘history thus written becomes a 
history not of ideas at all, but of abstractions: a history of thoughts which no one ever 
actually succeeded in thinking, at a level of coherence which no one ever actually 
attained.’112 This leads to two practices labelled pejoratively as ‘metaphysical’.113 The first is 
to discount elements of the author’s own work which do not fit in to the idea they were 
supposedly writing about, such as ignoring the early work of Locke on government as it 
contradicts the later work and is not addressing the ‘liberal’ political views Locke is 
supposed to have held.114 The second ‘metaphysical belief’ is not to exclude contradiction, 
but to forcibly include it. Contradictions in a body of work cannot be contradictions, and the 
historian’s role is to explain how a perceived contradiction is in fact part of the coherent 
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whole. Therefore an earlier text is made to submit to analysis in line with later work, or the 
ideas present in the earlier work are held to continue to exist in the mature text.  
These mythologies continue in more subtle ways; for example in the continued fascination 
with setting out lineages from one thinker to another, leading to the ultimate explanation of 
a theory. This is the reading of, in Skinner’s example, Machiavelli as the father of modern 
political thought, or as in the example of Lauterpacht, Grotius as the father of international 
law. This may be true as a statement of an author’s historical significance, but it contributes 
nothing to understanding the text itself. Worse, it leads to the reading of the text looking for 
the signs of anticipating the next generation, and the sowing of the seeds for the final 
outcome. This is again the reading of historical texts for what they say about the present, 
and as contributions in the construction of a necessary present. This is apologetic history. 
Ultimately, the reception of a work at any time, and any renewal of interest, raises the 
question again of why the work is being read, and how it is being understood.  
Skinner’s solution is a modification of the approach of reading the text in its context. The 
contextual approach is not free of problems itself. While clearly holding advantages over 
this study of the history of ideas for contributions to timeless and universal debates, a 
narrow insistence on reading a text in its context has its own problems. Skinner argues that 
this practice rests on ‘a fundamental mistake about the nature of the relations between 
action and circumstance.’115 Put briefly, the problem is that an insistence on the explanation 
of actions is grounded exclusively in the conditions of the action. This rules out many 
considerations which may be useful in understanding what an author was trying to do. 
Intention to do something is part of causation and prior to an act, but intention in doing 
something is not, it is concurrent with the action and cannot be a cause. A study purely of 
the context which caused an action misses this out. Secondly, looking only at the cause of an 
action misses the way a text was understood. This is the difference between the meaning 
which an author puts in to a text, and the understanding with which it is received. The 
reception of a text must be taken in to account to gain a full appreciation of it.  
Skinner’s method for the history of ideas is that to know what an author was doing we must 
know what he intended to do and what he was understood as doing. His intentions can be, 
and must be, informed by the present historical context, but we must also take account of 
how the text was understood, and also what the author themselves thought they were 
doing. The context does not determine what is said; rather it is the framework for 
understanding what is said and what it might have been possible to say in the given context. 
The radical intention of this method is then made clear in Skinner’s conclusion; 
[I]t has I think become clear that any attempt to justify the study of the subject in 
terms of the “perennial problems” and “universal truths” to be learned from the 
classic texts must amount to the purchase of justification at the expense of making 
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the subject itself foolishly and needlessly naïve. Any statement, as I have sought to 
show, is inescapably the embodiment of a particular intention, on a particular 
occasion, addressed to the solution of a particular problem, and thus specific to its 
situation in a way that it can only be naïve to try to transcend. […] [T]here simply are 
no perennial problems in philosophy: there are only individual answers to individual 
questions, with as many different answers as there are questions, and as many 
different questions as there are questioners.116 
This absolute focus on contingency as an attack on the majority of work done in studying 
the history of ideas does not lead to a desperate conclusion however. This contingency does 
not render the study purely academic and ultimately impossible, although it may seem to. 
Instead, by discovering for example what Locke’s questions were, and what his answers 
were for himself, and how he was received, it should be possible to see how different his 
society was from ours. Locke should not be read to find what Jeremy Waldron has slightly 
foolishly called ‘as well-worked-out a theory of basic equality as we have in the canon of 
political philosophy’.117 Locke should be read to discover what Locke meant by equality, and 
what he was trying to do. This way we can be free to think about what we might desire by 
the term equality, or whether we desire it at all.118 There exists the possibility to think again 
unburdened by the ‘great texts’, since they have been put in their proper place. 
The historian of this school most often referred to by international lawyers is Richard Tuck. 
The Rights of War and Peace119 is an engagement with the history of international law by a 
historian. It prioritises the analysis of texts, as discursive acts, in their context. I will also pay 
particular attention to Tuck’s version of Grotius, as the second example of a history. Firstly, I 
want to look at this work as an example of contextualist history. 
Tuck argues that, read in their context, which is as they were intended and understood as 
speech acts, the famous liberal works from Grotius and Hobbes to Rousseau and Kant could 
not argue for a sovereign individual without also arguing for a sovereign state. The 
emergence of the sovereign individual is inextricably linked to the emergence of the 
sovereign state, both of which are made possible by new ways of thinking demanded by 
European expansion. As Weber put it, ‘the historical origin of modern freedom has had 
certain unique preconditions which will never repeat themselves’,120 that is, the discovery 
and conquest of new worlds. The invention of freedom and democracy was made possible 
by this expansion. Without any new worlds to discover, their existence ceases to be possible 
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‘under the domination of highly developed capitalism’.121 This use of the context in which 
ideas of individual liberty were created leads to a questioning of the philosophical 
foundations upon which that liberty rests. Ultimately, in a world where the free sovereign 
state has largely ceased to exist, and the language of international affairs refers more often 
to the police action of the international community, the opportunity to even think about the 
free individual has passed.122 This creates space for a re-examining of the origins of these 
ideas and demands a new account of how people might live morally.  
Tuck’s Grotius, as opposed to Lauterpacht’s, is a writer completely situated in his time.123 
Grotius is writing primarily about the private war being waged by the Dutch East Indies 
Company against the Portuguese crown. Grotius is also concerned with the war for 
independence between the United Dutch Provinces and Spain, and in The Law of War and 
Peace particularly, the on-going Thirty Years War. This history of Grotius emphasises his 
‘strong version of an international right to punish, and to appropriate territory which was 
not being used properly by indigenous peoples’.124 Tuck also situates Grotius as starting the 
modern liberal rights discourse, with ‘a far reaching account of what agents can do to one 
another, both in the state of nature and in the international arena’.125 His successors then 
had to struggle with these ‘brutal implications’.126 
This contextual approach produces a fundamentally different story to the traditional history 
offered by Lauterpacht. Grotius is no longer the Father of an international law which seeks 
to limit the excesses of state behaviour, to humanise and ultimately end war. Instead he 
launches a rights discourse which is hugely permissive, and focused on punishment and 
appropriation. Tuck uses history to consciously attack these traditional narratives, and offer 
a radical alternative. This alternative Grotius not only gives us an argument that the origins 
of international law were explicitly imperial, but it also reveals the politics behind 
Lauterpacht’s writing. This Grotius would not be such a suitable candidate for Lauterpacht’s 
tradition, and Lauterpacht’s arguments do not fit quite so comfortably in this mouth. This 
critique provides the opportunity to challenge and oppose the politics behind a history such 
as Lauterpacht’s. 
Anne Orford has very recently dismissed the radical potential of contextual history: ‘the self-
imposed task of today’s contextualist historians is to think about concepts in their proper 
time and place – the task of international lawyers is to think about how concepts move 
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across time and space.’127 This discards too much that can be useful in the contextualist 
study of history. I also find it curious that Orford takes this position, since her own preferred 
method of description seems to fit in with the historical method I am discussing here. 
Orford has recently argued for ‘a turn to description as a mode of legal writing’.128 Emerging 
from various attempts to understand the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, Orford, 
rather than seek ‘what the … concept really meant at some deeper level’ instead 
approaches ‘the concept as an articulation of international authority’s ‘consciousness of 
itself’.129 Or, to quote Foucault, Orford sets herself the task to ‘make visible precisely what is 
visible … to make us see what we see’130. 
It strikes me that this is exactly the same task that a radical history undertakes. By removing 
grand narratives, the myths of doctrine and coherence, the contextual approach to history 
as set out by Skinner and practiced by Tuck, does help us see what we see. History can be 
freed to explore again what is contingent, and what is necessary, in contemporary social 
reality. Furthermore, it demonstrates why this is so, and opens space to ask what is to be 
done about it. Orford’s approach is largely inspired by Foucault. However, before turning my 
attention to him, I want to introduce a third Cambridge school historian who has most 
obviously engaged with Foucault’s work and attempted to adopt some techniques from his 
methodology. 
James Tully first attempted a ‘Foucauldian’ history in An Approach to Political Philosophy131, 
and continued his reading of Foucault in Strange Multiplicity132 and most recently in the two 
volumes of Public Philosophy in a New Key.133 Tully, drawing inspiration from Wittgenstein, 
Skinner and Foucault, prioritises practices of governance as an area for study, with the aim 
of disclosing ‘the historically contingent conditions of possibility of this historically singular 
set of practices of governance and of the range of characteristic problems and solutions to 
which it gives rise’.134 This Tully calls ‘practical philosophy’, which is practical in two senses; 
firstly because it has a use and secondly because it engages with ‘concrete struggles’. The 
use of history in addressing these problems of governance is ‘as an object of comparison 
and contrast’, which shows ‘the practices and their forms of problematisation as a limited 
and contingent whole’. This historical and critical relationship with the present is then used 
to engage with ‘concrete struggles, negotiations and implementations of citizens who 
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experiment with modifying practices of governance on the ground’. 135 Foucault provides a 
synopsis of the approach which Tully favours; 
The critical ontology of ourselves must be considered not, certainly, as a theory or a 
doctrine; rather it must be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in 
which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis 
of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond 
them.136 
In An Approach to Political Philosophy, Tully’s Foucauldian approach begins with a discussion 
of the emergence of the new governance problems which arose out of European expansion 
in the 16th and 17th centuries.137 This new mercantilist system is the system of governance 
which Tully argues Locke was writing in and about. Locke is revisited as writing about the 
problems of the juridical way of governing which was created in this period. In Strange 
Multiplicity Tully’s focus is on struggles of cultural recognition, but in Public Philosophy in a 
New Key the focus is widened to recognition more generally. For Tully, the scope of 
recognition is co-extensive with governance. Recognition concerns the way individuals or 
groups are recognised as part of a governance system, by other members of that system. By 
then exploring a variety of historical issues attached to the recognition of people for 
governance, most obviously imperialism138 and Indigenous peoples,139 but also questions of 
cosmopolitanism,140 constitutionalism141, mass communications142 and globalisation.143 Tully 
questions and undermines the notion of unified public, and instead prioritises the struggle 
over recognition itself. Tully then uses a contextual history, while considering governance 
and power after Foucault, to try and increase the opportunity and space for struggle. In 
conclusion, he suggests a practical identity engaged with these free, open and pluralistic 
struggles, and that solidarity to this engagement is a source of peace in a conflicted 
society.144   
I disagree then with Orford’s charge that contextual history is not an engagement with 
contemporary reality. I will discuss later more general criticisms of the contextual approach, 
but for now I think it is enough to say that while people can still ask what Grotius thinks 
about the invasion of Iraq,145 the lessons of contextual history are yet to be learnt in 
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international legal scholarship. These lessons start with what not to do, but also provide 
positive instructions on what to do. They allow the construction of historically defensible 
arguments in the history of ideas. Skinner’s politics may not be our politics, but he is 
involved in a political struggle over meaning and understanding. This is the struggle of any 
engagement in an argument, and it can be usefully taken on. 
The purpose of the contextual study of famous texts is to better understand the present, to 
understand ‘the distinction between what is necessary and what is the product merely of 
our own contingent arrangements’.146 This is a purpose with radical possibilities, with a lot 
in common with the Marxist approach, and which answers the call of discovering 
contingency whilst not forgetting what is necessary. My next subject would certainly reject 
the focus on authors, but is never the less an approach to history I also want to call radical. 
4.3 Michel Foucault  
The general label of ‘postmodern’ is even less helpful than the previous two. Including 
within it approaches to the study of science, knowledge, art, literature, and psychology, 
amongst other things, by authors with sometimes even less in common than the country 
and decade of their birth. I won’t use it until I turn to the disagreements between the 
different approaches I have been discussing. Instead I will focus on the historical works of 
Michel Foucault.147 
Foucault’s work is difficult to summarise, and his statements on his own methodology are 
scattered throughout his work. However, there are some texts in which he sets out what he 
is trying to do, and also the work of Paul Veyne, which Foucault highlighted as the best 
explanation of his work available.148 Veyne described the central thesis of Foucault’s work: 
‘What is made, the object, is explained by what went into its making at each moment of 
history’.149 This captures Foucault’s interest in objects and the practices which go in to 
them. So for example in the study of prisons,150 the focus is not on ‘“institutions,” 
“theories,” or “ideology” but practices.’151 Foucault is not interested in authors, and they are 
peripheral in much of his work, something which places a big gap between him and Skinner. 
However structures are very important and his position is by no means as far from the 
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Marxist as it might seem, and as he sometimes said.152 Practices produce information. This 
information is studied and ordered. This process is rationality. Rationalities are the 
conditions of truth, the way that something can be verified as ‘true’. The rationality in turn 
explains and orders the practice. A good example of this type of historical study is the 
lecture ‘Truth and Juridical Forms’.153 Here, Foucault traces the development and evolution 
of trials and judging. The move from trial by ordeal to trial by jury is a production of 
different types of rationality, different conditions of truth.  
In his explanation of Foucault’s work, Veyne starts by generously setting aside the 
problematic word ‘discourse’, with its suggestion of linguistics, and instead clarifying that 
the focus of Foucault’s work was always practice, even when it was practice by way of 
discourse.154 Foucault’s focus within practice is ‘exceptionality, rarity’155 or to use another 
familiar Foucauldian term ‘discontinuity’.156 He draws attention to the things which don’t fit, 
or seem to make sense, such as the shock at the use of the prison for general punishment in 
the nineteenth century, and uses this discontinuity in the continuity of ‘what everybody 
knows’ as a starting point to complicate the picture. Veyne stresses repeatedly that Foucault 
is simply doing history, proper history, which all historians should feel comfortable with.157 
The idea of practice allows consideration of all processes; society, the economy, the form of 
government, and orders them through practice.  
The problems thrown up by ideas such as ‘there are no facts’158 or ‘madness does not 
exist’159 are explained by Veyne.  Madness exists as a phenomenon, but it is not a thing. The 
contrary is also true, madness does not exist, but it is not therefore nothing. Madness is not 
a natural object; it is made to seem so by a series of practices. Madness itself, the 
description of it, the response to it, and the treatment of it, is made up of a series of 
practices, and to study the practice is to study the whole thing. Ultimately, this is all part of 
Foucault’s attempt to move away from rationality.  
Foucault’s starting point in studying this history is that ‘[w]e are … at war with one another; 
a battlefront runs through the whole of society, continuously and permanently, and it is this 
battlefront that puts us all on one side or the other’.160 From this starting point, all ideas of 
neutrality and objectivity are abandoned. To understand the present state of the world, we 
have to trace the battles which were fought and the victories which were won to make it so. 
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This is not a traditional historical way of speaking, but is instead an historico-political 
discourse. This is a history which is directed by political struggle. There is no neutral 
position, the ‘truth’ of history is ‘a truth that can be deployed only from its combat position, 
from the perspective of the sought-for victory and ultimately … of the survival of the 
speaking subject himself’.161 By accepting this link between truth and force, Foucault reveals 
that the claim of truth is always used as a weapon in a struggle. Taking a side, being against 
something, is to move away from a position which accepts the truth and instead to 
challenge it. It reveals the ways that we are made to ‘believe we are living in a world in 
which order and peace have been restored’.162 Foucault’s history reignites a struggle which 
has been hidden and obscured by a more traditional form of history, the history which tells 
us that all is for the best.  
The other vital aspect of Foucault’s work is that it is ‘history of the present’.163 Foucault’s 
approach is both historical and critical. He writes history consciously from his present, and 
he is ultimately the focus in an attempt to understand the limits on present consciousness. 
That is to say that when Foucault asks why other historians wrote the history they did, he 
does not hide from the implied question of why he writes the history he does. History 
addresses the present by exposing the limits to our understanding and experience that are 
historically constructed. Critical history study is an attempt to break these limits.164 As 
Foucault puts it: ‘It’s a matter of shaking this false self-evidence, of demonstrating [the 
object’s/practice’s] precariousness, of making visible not its arbitrariness but its complex 
interconnection with a multiplicity of historical processes’.165 
Roth pushes the idea that Foucault is writing from a present of epistemic shift.166 The 
episteme begun by Kant, in which knowledge was governed, fundamentally, by 
anthropology, is coming to an end. The new episteme, or a priori in Roth’s preferred term, is 
begun by removing man as the limit on what is and can be known. Foucault explicitly 
compares himself to Kant:  
Anthropology constitutes the fundamental arrangement that governed and 
controlled the path of philosophic thought from Kant until our own day. This 
arrangement is essential, since it forms part of our history; but it is disintegrating 
before our eyes, since we are beginning to recognise and denounce in it, in a critical 
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mode, both the forgetfulness of the opening that made it possible and a stubborn 
obstacle standing obstinately in the way of an imminent form of thought.167 
This is obviously radical. But it is also, I believe, a position not so far from what I have 
already discussed. This again is a use of history to question the present, without ignoring the 
structures limiting possibility. Foucault, partly as described by Veyne, gives us a series of 
things to do and not to do, as have the Marxists and the Contextualists. Objects are 
dismissed, truth is made contingent, ideology is forgotten, along with all ‘-isms’, as merely 
reified rationalities. This might make things complicated, and I think the commentary on 
Foucault is sometimes over complicated, but it does leave something very useful. It 
demands the exploration of all the surrounding factors of any historical question. This 
Foucault calls ‘eventalization’, and his aim is to remove the burden of explaining causality by 
constructing all the different ways of understanding a singular event.168 Nothing is left out, 
nothing is necessarily prioritised. This may be contingency with all falseness forgotten, but I 
don’t think so.  
Foucault was not interested in the outrage he might cause in the traditional study of the 
penal system, or psychiatry, or whatever else. For him ‘[t]he only important problem is what 
happens on the ground’.169 By ‘shaking’ the faith in the usual answer to the question of 
what is to be done about prisons, the question of ‘what is to be done’ is put back in to the 
hands of the people actually affected by imprisonment. Foucault’s critique takes the 
authority to propose reform away from those who govern, and also away from himself or 
any other commentator. This is crucial in understanding Foucault’s usefulness, and 
challenging the rejection of his work as not useful for not proposing any serious reform. In 
challenging and revealing structures of domination and control, and the on-going nature of 
political struggle, Foucault argued as much against leaders or philosophers as any other 
target. It is absolutely and demonstrably not the purpose of political philosophy or critical 
thinking to propose reform. But that does not mean there is nothing constructive here. 
Foucault constructs the very possibility of resistance and struggle, in revealing the nature 
and form of control and subjugation. Critique:  
should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse what is. Its 
use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn’t 
have to lay down the law for the law. It isn’t a stage in a programming. It is a 
challenge directed to what is.170  
Or as Marx once described his project; ‘ruthless criticism of everything existing’.171 
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Foucault wrote 'I would like my books to be a kind of tool-box which others can rummage 
through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own area. [...] I don't 
write for an audience, I write for users, not readers.'172 Foucault allows us to understand 
better the construction and control of the present. This is clearly a fecund area for political 
action, if not a political project in and of itself. 
4.4 Don’t be Vulgar 
In these three authors or approaches I have sought to draw a unifying line of using the past 
to question the present. History can and should be employed in political argument, as a 
tactic against the crushing use of ideology founded on a (wilful?) misreading or 
misappropriation of history and of the present. I now want to briefly deal with some of the 
problems of putting these three groups together, and some of the attacks made by or on 
behalf of each group. I keep in mind the imperative ‘don’t be vulgar’ after Hobsbawm’s 
characterisation of ‘vulgar Marxism’. Ultimately, I think many of the conflicts between 
different approaches are based on a ‘vulgar’ reading of the method.  
The vulgar Marxism Hobsbawm attacked was set out earlier, and was an attack on an 
oversimplified reading of Marx, which focused exclusively on certain big ideas whilst failing 
to pay attention to the subtleties of the approach proper. In two other essays in the same 
collection, Hobsbawm looks at postmodernism, and the failings of this new approach to 
history, and even the dangers of doing it.173 Foucault answers some of Hobsbawm’s 
complaints, as does Skinner. I contest that his use of ‘postmodern’ is itself vulgar, over 
simplified and putting certain eye-catching statements in the foreground whilst ignoring the 
subtleties.174  
Written as a review essay of Richard Price’s Maroon Societies,175 ‘Postmodernism in the 
Forest’ has plenty of praise for the content of the work while criticising the author’s ‘doubts 
about the possibility of objective knowledge or unified interpretation, that is to say, about 
the legitimacy of research as hitherto understood.’176 Price’s book does not follow these 
traditional practices, according to Hobsbawm, instead attempting to satisfy ‘the 
requirements of postmodernism’.177 The book, it seems, is full of useful information, 
presented in an incomprehensible way. In particular, it tells Hobsbawm nothing about the 
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most important questions of slavery, ownership of people and ownership of land. The study 
of alien peoples is what history has often done, accepting that the past is a different 
country, without the invention of postmodernism.178 Ultimately Hobsbawm feels that this 
was better, and told us more of what he has decided we need to know. 
Identity History is not Enough179 raises more clearly Hobsbawm’s complaints against 
‘postmodernism’. Here Hobsbawm focuses the discussion on the experience of Nazi retreat 
in 1944 in southern France, particularly the slaughter of the men of the villages and towns. 
These events raise many questions for historical understanding of universality, identity, past 
and present, lived historical memory and detached academic research. History is a product 
used and misused by non-historians. It is an historian’s duty to seek truth and point out 
fiction. However, the ‘fashion’ for ‘postmodernism’ is based on a sceptical approach to the 
enlightenment project and rationality.180 This leads to, amongst other things, the return of 
fiction as equally valid, the disavowal of the importance of truth and a very dangerous space 
for reckless invention and misuse of history. Hobsbawm’s emotive example of fact is the 
Holocaust, and apparently a postmodern approach allows the denial of the Holocaust’s 
historical truth.181 To be fair, Hobsbawm is not seeking a return to any form of scientific 
positivist truth, but instead believes the value of history and the public responsibility of 
historians, to be undermining ideological fictions by producing truth. Historians are ‘myth-
slayers’.182  
This is, I argue, a vulgar reading of postmodernism. Firstly, on the question of ‘facts’, I want 
to turn to Skinner to clarify. In attacking an extreme proponent of positivist history, much 
stronger than Hobsbawm’s claims, Skinner characterises Geoffrey Elton and his insistence 
on the purity of historical method as ‘the cult of the fact’.183 The cult of the fact believes 
that ‘by uncovering the facts of history, the historian can aspire to discover “the true reality 
of the past”’.184 This assumes that what is fact is self evident, and that the truth is 
recognisable from the assembly of facts. Again, Hobsbawm claims nothing like this, and 
would probably join Skinner in rejecting this image of history. However, Hobsbawm does 
cling to the idea of facts.  
Skinner demonstrates how difficult it is to say what a fact is. His example is in cataloguing 
the art which has been owned or displayed in Chatsworth House.185 To assert this as fact 
requires an answer to what a work of art is, a definition which is hardly uncontested but 
which is required instantly for the historian to do any work. The dismissal of facts as 
absolute things is here dealt with at a higher level than saying that something was or wasn’t 
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in Chatsworth House. It is a problem of definition, of concepts, and of perceptions. This is 
the subtly which is at the heart of any move away from facts and the search for truth. 
Secondly, and more generally, I think that Hobsbawm’s complaints misconstrue Foucault’s 
work, as a leading example of what he terms postmodern. Hobsbawm makes no reference 
to Foucault as a historian, but does note that ‘[Price] is to be congratulated for deliberately 
avoiding references to Barthes, Bakhtin, Derrida, Foucault et al.’186 I want to briefly draw on 
two writers who have tried to reconcile Foucault and Marx, so as to better contest current 
political struggles.  
Foucault wrote that ‘Marxism exists in the nineteenth century like a fish in water: that is, it 
is unable to breath anywhere else’,187 but his work is filled with allusions and references to 
Marx, particularly some of the collections of lectures:  
I often quote concepts, texts and phrases from Marx, but without feeling obliged to 
add the authenticating label of a footnote with a laudatory phrase to accompany the 
quotation. As long as one does that, one is regarded as someone who knows and 
reveres Marx, and will be suitably honoured in the so-called Marxist journals. But I 
quote Marx without saying so, without quotation marks, and because people are 
incapable of recognising Marx’s texts I am thought to be someone who doesn’t 
quote Marx. When a physicist writes a work of physics, does he feel it necessary to 
quote Newton and Einstein? He uses them, but he doesn’t need the quotation 
marks, the footnote and the eulogistic comment to prove how completely he is 
being faithful to the master’s thought.188 
I think it is revealing, but should not be over stated, that Foucault put Marx in such a 
position in his thinking. Similarly to Kant, Marx is accepted as a master, who has to be learnt 
from and used, but also addressed critically, and surpassed. Part of the tension between a 
Foucauldian study and a Marxist study is that Foucault places Marx in this previous 
episteme, the one he is trying to escape. This is why he can say that Ricardo and Marx are 
the same, they both look at society in the same way, looking at economics and wage 
relationships, and the conflicts between them as merely ‘storms in a children’s paddling 
pool’.189 However, whilst this epistemic distinction continues, Foucault’s attitude to Marx 
changes, or at least softens in later work. These two highly critical engagements with Marx 
take place in a book which is filled with aggressive attacks on Marxism, and written perhaps 
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with a conscious effort to distance the author from the particular form of French Marxism 
then prevalent.190 
Alan Hunt writes an autobiographical story of his own struggle to reconcile his interests in 
both Marx and Foucault. He finds value in the very different focuses of Marx and Foucault, 
and believes that both can be held in mind when addressing his interests in law. The two 
come closest together in this reading on the question of practices. While Foucault clearly 
states his interest in practices, Hunt argues that Marx also held practice as a central focus, 
quoting from The German Ideology: 
The social structure and the state are continually evolving out of the life process of 
definite individuals […] as they actually are, i.e. as they act, produce materially, and 
hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions 
independent of their will.191 
This shared interest provides a starting point for reconciliation, and hope that there is some 
legitimacy in using both authors. Ultimately, Foucault reminds us of contingency and Marx 
of process and determinacy.  
Simon Springer offers a more thorough attempt to use Foucault and Marx together, and a 
demonstration of what is to be gained.192 By looking at neoliberalism through the 
methodology of Foucault and Marx, Springer finds neoliberalism as a discourse, but a 
discourse which is constituted by and constitutive of material forms.193 It is neither best 
understood as ‘top-down ideological hegemony’ or ‘bottom-up, as in post-structuralist 
notions of governmentality’.194 The discourse is instead rooted in the material, with primacy 
given to both structure and agency. His project is not complete, and he does not claim 
success, but finds that anything useful in destabilising neoliberalism’s rationalities is useful 
in itself. This sentiment is very Foucauldian. 
A couple of further points need to be made concerning Foucault’s relationship with 
Marxism. Firstly, there is a context which might explain some of the scorn Foucault directed 
towards Marx and Marxism; the French Communist Party (FCP). In an interview with Duccio 
Trombadori in 1978 Foucault discussed Marxism and his own experiences at length.195 He 
joined the FCP in 1950, like many of his contemporaries, in search of ‘an utterly different 
reality’.196 He left the party in 1953, after the party had supported the fictitious and anti-
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Semitic ‘Doctors’ Plot’ against Stalin.197 He also felt excluded because of his homo-sexuality, 
and that the Communist Party upheld the traditional bourgeois conceptions of normal 
life.198 Foucault had joined the party under the influence of Althusser, one of his tutors at 
the École Normale, and they remained friendly for the rest of Althusser’s life, despite 
Foucault’s rejection of Marxism and the FCP, in which Althusser played a prominent role. His 
time in the party, Foucault claimed, at least taught him something about the pliability of 
truth; ‘the fact of being obliged to maintain something that was radically opposed to what 
one could believe was also part of that exercise of dissolution of the self and the search for 
the entirely other’.199  
Christopher Chitty has recently produced a new English translation of a text which is absent 
from any current English language collections of Foucault’s work; ‘Les Mailles de Pouvoir’ – 
‘The Mesh of Power’.200 Chitty argues that Foucault’s growing interest in power as a subject 
of study coincides with a renewed interest in Marx.201 The ‘Mesh of Power’ text is the most 
obvious engagement with Marx by Foucault. In it Foucault claims that his theory of power is, 
at least in part, derived from the second volume of Capital;202  
What we may find in the second volume of Capital is that one power does not exist, 
but many powers. Powers, this means forms of domination, forms of subjugation 
that function locally, for example in the workshop, in the army, on a slave plantation 
or where there are subservient relations.203 
He also attributes to Marx the local functioning of power existing first, and only later 
forming a State; 
These powers cannot and must not simply be understood as the derivation, the 
consequence of some kind of overriding power that would be primary. The schema 
of the jurists, whether those of Grotius, Pufendorf, or Rousseau, amounts to saying: 
“In the beginning, there was no society, and then society appeared when a central 
point of sovereignty appeared to organise the social body, which then permitted a 
whole series of local and regional powers”; implicitly, Marx does not recognise this 
schema. He shows, on the contrary, how, starting from the initial and primitive 
                                                     
197
 Ibid. 
198
 James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault, (Anchor Books: London, 1993) at 58  
199
 Foucault, ‘Interview with Michel Foucault’, in Essential Works, supra note 11, at 249 
200
 Michel Foucault, ‘The Mesh of Power’, 2 Viewpoint Magazine (September 2012) available at 
http://viewpointmag.com/the-mesh-of-power/ 
201
 Christopher Chitty, ‘Towards a Socialist Art of Government: Michael Foucault’s “The Mesh of Power”’ 2 
Viewpoint Magazine (September 2012) available at http://viewpointmag.com/towards-a-socialist-art-of-
government-michel-foucaults-the-mesh-of-power/ 
202
 Foucault is making a reference here to the second volume of Capital, but he does not mean Volume Two, 
but the edition published by Editions Sociales in France. This second volume comprises Sections, 4, 5, and 6 of 
Volume One of Capital, the sections on the production of relative and absolute surplus value. 
203
 Foucault, ‘The Mesh of Power’ supra note 200, at 3 
This Article is pre-publication. Please do not cite. 
 
existence of these small regions of power – like property, slavery, workshops, and 
also the army – little by little, the great State apparatuses were able to form. 204 
The link between power and production is clear. The exercise of these different forms of 
power was, and is, to improve production; 
The original, essential and permanent function of these local and regional powers is, 
in reality, being producers of the efficiency and skill of the producers of a product. 
Marx, for example, has superb analyses of the problem of discipline in the army and 
workshops. 205 
Foucault is here himself attacking a crude form of Marxism. Marx did not prioritise the State 
as an object of study or as the principle exerciser of power over citizens. Instead, Foucault 
finds Marx much more aware of the micro-levels AT which power operates, and the 
fundamental importance of awareness that power is productive. In this piece, Foucault 
rejects outright certain ‘Marxists’, while making his clearest statements in favour of the 
importance of Marx as an inspiration;  
To privilege the State apparatus, the function of preservation, the juridical 
superstructure, is, basically, to “Rousseauify” Marx. It reinscribes Marx in the 
bourgeois and juridical theory of power.206 
5. Conclusion 
To try and offer some sort of conclusion, I want to take something from all these 
approaches into my study of the history of international law. The contingency of the present 
is important to remember, and I think history is often the best demonstration of this. That 
remains the shared aim of everyone I have mentioned – to change the present by 
understanding the past. The problem of too much contingency is that this can leave no 
ground on which to build any political action. As I have said, I think this is primarily a failing 
of a vulgar form of post modernism. However, in trying to respond to the challenge set out 
by Susan Marks, I agree that Marxism, or perhaps simply materialism, must have its place in 
any radical history. My personal preference is for the contextual work of James Tully, with 
his open acknowledgement of Foucault’s influence. His book Locke in Contexts begins the 
analysis with a discussion of the birth of the ‘welfare-warfare’ state, and the material 
desires of European peoples breaching their national borders at the end of the Wars of 
Religion. I think this is a useful reminder of the conditions in which men were able to make 
their own history.  
I also want to conclude my parallel discussion of historiography more generally. I have used 
histories of Grotius as examples in this piece, and I want to end with a third history of 
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Grotius. Benjamin Straumann has produced a lot of research dealing with the use of Roman 
sources by Grotius.207 Grotius’ work is full of references to and quotations from classical 
sources, particularly Cicero and the Stoics. This fact is overlooked or dismissed in both the 
versions of Grotius offered by Lauterpacht and Tuck. By placing this in the foreground as an 
object of study, Straumann can tell a different story. Grotius drew on the normative Roman 
tradition to formulate his secular doctrine of international rights. This is the strength of his 
argument, and the authority for his radical claims in defence of the war waged by the Dutch 
East Indies Company. It also suggests that Grotius’ fundamental concern, and the basis upon 
which he founded his systematic approach, was the clash between natural sociability and 
commercial unsociability. For modern scholarship, this raises important questions about the 
origins of modern liberalism and the rights discourse. The founding texts may be ancient, 
and not modern, and the twentieth century ‘Roman’ as much as it is ‘Grotian’.  
In this article I have introduced three different histories of Grotius. While Lauterpacht’s 
version may be easily dismissed as ideological, it is fundamentally a true history. So too are 
the histories of Tuck and Straumann. It is their purposes that are different. Lauterpacht is 
seeking a source for his own project, calling it Grotian to borrow the authority of the ‘Father 
of International Law’. Tuck is seeking to undermine the tradition of liberal rights thinking, by 
demonstrate its specifically imperialist context. Straumann seems to be looking for a new 
way to talk about contemporary theories of international law, by exposing long forgotten 
Stoic thinking about international society. These histories are all possible and all true to 
their own standards because history has many different stories within it, and absolute truth 
is utterly impossible.  
To return to Hayden White, at the beginning of Metahistory he asks ‘What does it mean to 
think historically, and what are the unique characteristics of a specifically historical method 
of inquiry?’208 As he says, definitive answers may not be possible, but what can be revealed 
are the different styles of historical thinking. A style is adopted when writing history, when 
choosing this form of argument. A step is taken in deciding the form of narrative used to 
turn ‘knowing into telling’, there are choices to be made over the form of the history, and its 
content.209 This is the political choice taken. I have set out three related political choices, 
each united by wanting to use history to change the present. This task can be more 
successfully undertaken by reflecting on the method of history which is being used. If we 
want to change the world, we must understand why things are the way they are, and how 
they could have been different. I finish on White’s own understanding of why history is 
important in any political project; 
One can never move with any politically effective confidence from an apprehension 
of “the way things actually are or have been” to the kind of moral insistence that 
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they “should be otherwise” without passing through a feeling of repugnance for and 
negative judgement of the condition that is to be superseded.210  
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